Validity of Nonsolicitation Clauses in Employment Contracts by Courville, Craig A.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 48 | Number 3
January 1988
Validity of Nonsolicitation Clauses in Employment
Contracts
Craig A. Courville
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Craig A. Courville, Validity of Nonsolicitation Clauses in Employment Contracts, 48 La. L. Rev. (1988)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol48/iss3/5
VALIDITY OF NONSOLICITATION CLAUSES IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
Introduction
Historically, Louisiana courts have been opposed to the enforcement
of agreements in restraint of trade or competition., The courts strictly
construe agreements restricting competition whether the agreement is in
the form of restrictions on competition by a former employee, restrictions
on competition by the seller of a business, or some variation of agreement
which has the effect of limiting competition. This comment will address
one variation of non-competition clauses: clauses prohibiting solicitation
of customers by an employee upon termination of the employment
relationship.
The current trend of Louisiana courts is to view "nonsolicitation
of customers" clauses as restrictions on competition by a former em-
ployee under Louisiana Revised Statutes (La. R.S.) 23:921, which pro-
vides:
No employer shall require or direct any employee to enter into
any contract whereby the employee agrees not to engage in any
competing business for himself, or as the employee of another,
upon'the termination of his contract of employment with such
employer, and all such contracts, or provisions thereof containing
such agreement shall be null and unenforceable in any court,
provided that in those cases where the employer incurs an expense
in the training of the employee or incurs an expense in the
advertisement of the business ... the employee is permitted to
agree and bind himself that at the termination of his or her
employment that said employee will not enter into the same
business that employer is engaged over the same route or in the
same territory for a period of two years. 2
The underlying purpose of this statute is to protect an employee from
being deprived of his right to earn a better living by having the op-
portunity to freely leave his present employment in search of a better
job which may require the skills he has developed from prior work
experience.3 Therefore, non-competition agreements which have the effect
Copyright 1988, LOUISIUNA LAw REvtaw.
1. See Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967); National
Oil Service Inc. v. Brown, 381 So. 2d 1269 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980); Target Rental
Towel, Inc. v. Byrd, 341 So. 2d 600 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
2. La. R.S. 23:921 (1985).
3. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Foti, 302 So. 2d 593, 597 (La. 1974).
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of tying an employee to his present employment are against public
policy. 4
However, unlike a non-competition agreement where an employee
is absolutely prohibited from competing against his former employer
within a certain area, a "nonsolicitation of customers" clause allows
the employee to compete directly against the former employer with the
exception of soliciting a limited number of customers with whom the
employee previously dealt on behalf of the employer. While the employee
has a right to self-improvement through job mobility, an employer may
have a competing interest in the protection of his customers from com-
petition by an employee who is the employer's only contact with those
customers. In this situation the employee may gain influence over the
customers through regular contact away from the office, allowing him
to easily divert the customers from his former employer.
The courts will likely reach a more equitable result if "nonsolicitation
of customers" clauses are interpreted in light of all the circumstances
of each case with due regard for the competing interests of the employer,
the employee, and society, rather than interpreting these limited res-
trictions on competition under La. R.S. 23:921.
Before consideration of the enforceability of "nonsolicitation of
customers" clauses, the history of non-competition agreements ancillary
to employment contracts as well as the history of nonsolicitation clauses
is discussed. The historical analysis also includes a discussion of La.
R.S. 23:921. The comment then addresses some alternative approaches
of how courts can determine the validity of nonsolicitation clauses to
achieve an equitable balance between the conflicting interests of the
employer, employee, and public.
History of Non-Competition Agreements
Prior to 1934, decisions declaring non-competition agreements in
employment contracts invalid were uncertain as to the grounds for
nullity.' In 1934 the legislature tried to bring consistency to the inter-
pretation of non-competition clauses. 6 Act 133 of 1934 (now La. R.S.
23:921) provided an absolute prohibition of agreements restricting com-
petition by a former employee after termination of employment.7 The
4. Id.
5. Most decisions used the doctrine of serious consideration to find non-competition
agreements invalid. See Cloverland Dairy Prod. Co. v. Grace, 180 La. 694, 157 So. 393
(1934); Blanchard v. Haber, 166 La. 1014, 118 So. 117 (1928); see also Comment,
Agreements Not to Compete, 33 La. L. Rev. 94, 98-99 (1972).
6. 1934 La. Acts No. 133, codified as La. L. Rev. 94, 98-99 (1972).
7. Id.
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act was a strong indication that non-competition agreements in em-
ployment contracts were not favored in Louisiana.
Certain judicially created exceptions developed despite the broad
prohibitory language of Act 133. The exceptions fit under one of three
categories: (1) solicitation of customers or employees, (2) use of customer
lists, and (3) use of trade secrets.' The development of these exceptions
reveals the difficulty the courts faced in an effort to balance the com-
peting interests of the employer and employee while also keeping in
mind the public welfare. 9
In 1962 the legislature amended La. R.S. 23:921 to allow an exception
to the prohibition of non-competition agreements when the employer
had expended money in training the employee or in advertising the
business.' 0 Courts struggled over how to properly interpret the legisla-
ture's intent in amending the statute. The courts were not sure what
the legislature intended by the phrase "where the employer incurs an
expense in the training of the employee or incurs an expense in the
advertising of the business that the employer is engaged in."" There
was controversy among the circuits as to what amount of expenditures
was adequate to support a non-competition agreement. 2
The supreme court, in Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Foti,3 determined
that it would uphold a "non-competition agreement only where sub-
stantial funds were spent in special training or in special advertisement
of the employee himself (rather than generally of the business)."11 4 The
8. Comment, supra note 5, at 100. The employer's right to protection from the use
of customer lists and trade secrets is beyond the scope of this article. See Standard Brands,
Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967) (breach of faith for former employee
to disclose confidential information gained through employment); NCH Corp. v. Broyles,
749 F.2d 247 (5th Cir. 1985) (violation of La. R.S. 51:1405 for former employee to use
confidential collection of customers in routebook created by employer). For a detailed
discussion of an employer's right to protect customer lists and trade secrets, see 2 R.
Callmann, Unfair Competition Trademarks and Monopolies (4th ed. 1981).
9. For a good discussion on the competing interests of society, employees, and
employers, see Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625
(1960); Comment, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A Reassessment, 52 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 703, 712-25 (1985).
10. 1962 La. Acts 104.
11. La. R.S. 23:921 (1985).
12. The first circuit held that ordinary training expenses incident to employment were
sufficient to meet the limited exception under La. R.S. 23:921. Aetna Finance Co. v.
Adams, 170 So. 2d 740 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964), writ denied, 247 La. 489, 172 So. 2d
294 (1965). Conversely the third circuit interpreted the statute as requiring substantial
expenditures to support a non-competition agreement. National Motor Club v. Conque,
173 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 247 La. 875, 175 So. 2d 110 (1965).
13. 302 So. 2d 593 (La. 1974).
14. Id. at 595-96.
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court stated that the 1962 amendment 15 "provides only a limited ex-
ception to the stringent prohibition of the statute against such non-
competition agreements, and to the strong and long-established public
policy of this state to such effect."' 6
History of Nonsolicitation Agreements
In Martin-Parry Corp. v. New Orleans Fire Detection Service,17
decided in 1952, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that nonso-
licitation agreements do not have the effect of restricting competition
in violation of La. R.S. 23:921. Martin-Parry dealt with an agreement
whereby the employee agreed not to solicit or interfere with the owner's
employees and dealers after termination of his. employment. The court
held the agreement was enforceable and characterized the agreement not
to solicit employees or dealers as very different from agreements re-
stricting competition in general, which are contrary to public policy. s
The holding in Martin-Parry effectively puts agreements by an employee
not to solicit his former co-employees outside of the statutory restrictions
for non-competition agreements.' 9
In National Motor Club v. Conque,20 Judge Tate, writing for the
Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal-, distinguished the holding in
Martin-Parry. The court held that a contract prohibiting an employee
from selling memberships for a competitor to the company's customers
upon termination of employment was prohibited by La. R.S. 23:921,
unless the agreement was supported by substantial training or advertising
expenses. 2' Judge Tate reasoned that an agreement not to raid the
employer's staff and dealerships is not a restriction on competition,
while a clause prohibiting solicitation of the employer's customers in
effect prohibits the employee from engaging in competition with the
employer. 22
15. 1962 La. Acts 104.
16. Foti, 302 So. 2d at 596.
17. 221 La. 677, 60 So. 2d 83 (1952).
18. Id. at 683, 60 So. 2d at 85. It should be noted that the case did not address
the issue of nonsolicitation of "customers."
19. See John Jay Esthetic Salon, Inc. v. Woods, 377 So. 2d 1363 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1979); La. R.S. 23:921 (1985).
20. 173 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), writ denied, 247 La. 875, 175 So. 2d
110 (1965).
21. Id. at 243-44. See also Napasco Int'l Inc. v. Maxson, 420 So. 2d 1276 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1982); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Broussard, 346 So. 2d 1274 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 350 So. 2d 902 (La. 1977).
22. National Motor Club, 173 So. 2d at 244.
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The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal in Delta Finance
Co. v. Graves3 took a different stance and upheld an employment
contract containing a provision which prevented the employee from
soliciting any active or paid out customers of the employer. 24 The court
stated: "The contract of which Graves complains does not prohibit his
employment in a business competitive with the employer and thereby
conflict with LSA-R.S. 23:921, but only enjoins him not to solicit any
active or paid out customers of Delta....
Both the fourth and fifth circuits have adopted the rationale that
"nonsolicitation of customers" clauses must be supported by substantial
expenditures on the employee for training or advertising. 26 The fourth
circuit reached this conclusion in In re Standard Coffee Service Co. v.
Pries27 after it had earlier indicated that agreements prohibiting solici-
tation of the employer's customers would not be prohibited under La.
R.S. 23:921.28
Currently, Louisiana's third, fourth, and fifth circuits will uphold
agreements in employment contracts restraining employees from soliciting
the employer's customers only when the "substantial expenditures" test
is met under La. R.S. 23:921.29 The first circuit has yet to decide the
issue while the second circuit has held that nonsolicitation of customers
clauses are not prohibited by the statute.30 Despite the conflict among
the circuits, the supreme court has not addressed the issue.',
23. 180 So. 2d 85 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 88.
26. National Motor Club, 173 So. 2d 238. For cases following National Motor Club,
see In re Standard Coffee Service Co. v. Preis, 499 So. 2d 1314 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1986), writ denied, 501 So. 2d 232 (La. 1987); "Bugs" Burger Bug Killers v. Keiser, 463
So. 2d 45 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985); Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Simpson, 370 So.
2d 670 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 371 So. 2d 836 (La. 1979); Orkin Exterminating
Co. v. Broussard, 346 So. 2d 1274 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
27. 499 So. 2d 1314 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
28. See National Oil Service, Inc. v. Brown, 381 So. 2d 1269, 1273; (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1980) (court showed willingness to uphold nonsolicitation of customers clause as
exception to La. R.S. 23:921, but no such covenant was proved). It may be worthy to
note that the National Oil Service opinion was written by Judge Lemmon who is now a
Justice on the Louisiana Supreme Court.
29. See cases cited supra note 27.
30. Delta Finance Co. v. Graves, 180 So. 2d 85 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
31. See Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Neal, 669 F.2d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1982),
where the court was of the opinion that the Louisiana Supreme Court would decide the
issue by holding that agreements restricting solicitation of customers are restraints on
competition in violation of La. R.S. 23:921. See also NCH Corp. v. Broyles, 749 F.2d
247 (5th Cir. 1985).
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Customers as a Protectible Interest
Louisiana courts have closely examined various types of restrictive clauses
in employment contracts.2 This scrutiny reflects the strong public policy
in favor of preserving an individual's right to freedom and to self-
improvement through job mobility." The policy reasons may be less com-
pelling when an employee is restricted only from soliciting a discrete
number of customers whose identity the employee learned as a result of
his employment.3' It is argued, however, that employers would attempt
to use these nonsolicitation clauses to restrict competition in instances
where they would otherwise be prohibited by La. R.S. 23:921.35 Contraven-
tion of the statute can be prevented if the courts determine the true effect
of clauses prohibiting solicitation of customers by a former employee.
If the agreement is limited to a clearly defined group of customers and
still permits an employee to pursue work in the same field by soliciting
other customers in the area, the policy of the statute is not defeated.
The need for protection of the employer's customers will vary in
all instances.3 6 The general principle is that an "employer has a sufficient
interest in retaining his present customers to support an employee cov-
enant whenever the employee's relationship with customers is such that
there is a substantial risk that he may divert all or part of their
business. "37
The court's decision to uphold a non-competition agreement involves
balancing the competing interests of the employer, the employee, and
the public welfare. At common law this balance is struck by determining
the reasonableness of the restriction on competition.38 An agreement not
to compete will be upheld if the restrictions regarding duration and
geographical extent are reasonable under the circumstances. Louisiana,
however, has adopted the requirement that substantial sums be expended
32. See Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980 Obligations, Illegal Cause:
Agreements Not to Compete, 41 La. L. Rev. 355, 358, 366 (1981).
33. See National Motor Club v. Conque, 173 So. 2d at 241.
34. See Johnson, supra note 33, at 363.
35. National Motor Club, 173 So. 2d at 244.
36. Annotation, Enforceability of Restrictive Covenant, Ancillary to Employment
Contract, as Affected by Duration of Restriction, 41 A.L.R. 2d 71 (1955).
37. Blake, supra note 9, at 657.
38. 14 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts §1636 (3d ed. 1972). In
determining what is reasonable, consideration should be given to: (1) Whether the promise
is broader than that which is necessary to protect some legitimate interest of the promisee,
(2) the effect of the promise on the promisor, and (3) the effect of the promise on the
public. Id. See also Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17,
105 N.E. 2d 685 (1952).
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by the employer in order to uphold non-competition agreements ancillary
to an employment contract. 9
In determining whether the employer has expended sums on the
employee sufficient to support a non-competition agreement, the court
will consider the length of time the employee has served the employer. 40
The longer the length of service, the more likely the court will find
that the employer has already received the benefit of any investment
made in the employee. 41 However, this test will not protect employers
from former employees who have a competitive advantage since they
have been personally affiliated with the customers for a long period of
time. 42 These employers deserve greater protection since the long-term
employee has gained the customer's confidence and can easily divert
customers away from the employer. Therefore, as the employer's need
for protection increases with the length of time an employee remains
in his employ,43 the court will be less inclined to afford the employer
protection based on the theory that the employer has been compensated
for any investment made through the employee's services. 4
A more equitable test to determine the validity of agreements not
to solicit the employer's customers would be to base an employer's right
to protection on the basis of the customer contact theory.45 The customer
contact theory allows the courts to consider "(1) the frequency of the
employee's contacts with customers and whether they are the employer's
only relationship with those customers, (2) the locale of the contact,
and (3) perhaps most important, the nature of the functions performed
by the employee." '46 The courts will be more likely to uphold nonso-
licitation of customers clauses when the employee has frequent contact
with the customers away from the office and the employer's only re-
lationship with the customer is through the employee. 47
39. La. R.S. 23:921 (1985).
40. See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Foti, 302 So. 2d 593, 598 (La. 1974).
41. Id.
42. Annotation, supra note 37, at 73.
43. Id.
44. See Foti, 302 So. 2d at 598. The courts will protect an employer's customers
when the employee is engaging in unfair competiton. See La. R.S. 51:1405 (1987); see
also Dufau v. Creole Eng'g, Inc., 465 So. 2d 752 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985) (soliciting
employer's customers for employee's own business prior to termination of employment
constituted unfair competition).
45. See Blake, supra note 9, at 658-67.
46. Id. at 659. See also Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Ohio L.
Abs. 17, 105 N.E. 2d 685 (1952) for a detailed discussion of the differing nature of
possible customer contacts.
47. For a list of cases where the court applied the customer contact theory in upholding
agreements by the employee not to solicit his former employer's customers, see Annotation,
supra note 37, at 73-82.
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Under this approach to the validity of "nonsolicitation of customers"
clauses, the court is not faced with the problem of determining the
reasonablesness of the territorial extent of restriction. If the agreement
restricts the employee from soliciting only customers which the customer
contact theory dictates, the concern that the restriction may be geo-
graphically too broad is eliminated.
The court will still be forced to determine the reasonableness of the
duration of restriction. A reasonable duration of restriction is that period
of time which is necessary to allow the employer to replace the former
employee and to allow the new employee to become familiar with the
customers in such a way that the employer can equally compete with
the former employee to protect his business. 4 This general rule, however,
provides little guidance for determining what should be the actual du-
ration of restriction and inevitably leaves the court with wide discretion.
In order to avoid the possible inconsistency and confusion in de-
termining what is a reasonable period to restrict an employee, Louisiana
courts might look to La. R.S. 23:921, in which the legislature has
expressly stated that non-competition agreements shall in no case exceed
two years. Since nonsolicitation clauses are a limited form of restriction
on the employee, it is arguable that the legislature would also limit these
agreements to a maximum duration of two years as a matter of public
policy. This limitation would give the employer limited protection while
also helping insure that an employee does not enter into too burdensome
an agreement.
The customer contact theory, however, ignores the fact that the
goodwill generated in customers is largely relative to the skill and in-
dividual efforts of the employee. It is well recognized that it is in the
public's best interest to allow an employee to use the skills and knowledge
acquired during the ordinary course of prior work in his future em-
ployment. 49 Since the confidence gained in the customers is primarily
the fruit of the employee's efforts, the employee should be free to utilize
these fruits to his advantage in future employment. 0
However, an employee will not be permitted to use the fruits of
his prior employment when such fruits have resulted in a legitimate
trade secret 5 of the former employer.2 The Louisiana legislature rec-
48. See Annotation, supra note 37, at 73.
49. See Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 259 (E.D. La. 1967).
50. See id. at 268; Restatement (Second) of Agency § 396 (1957); Blake, supra note
9, at 654-55.
51. La. R.S. 51:1431(4) (1987) defines trade secret as "information, including a
formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (a)
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known
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ognized the possible inequities that might result from the unfettered
discretion of an employee to utilize all the fruits of his employment.
This recognition resulted in the enactment of the Unfair Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Law and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act."
With respect to trade secrets, the courts have found it necessary to
consider the circumstances of each particular case in order to balance
the employee's right to individual freedom with the employer's right to
protection of business assets.5 4 While a customer list may or may not
meet the statutory requirements of a trade secret, it may be an equally
valuable corporate asset. Therefore, the validity of agreements to protect
an employer's customers should also be determined by consideration of
all the circumstances rather than by a "substantial expenditures" test
under La. R.S. 23:921.
Restrictions on Competition to Protect Goodwill
Louisiana courts have recognized that non-competition agreements
ancillary to the sale of an ongoing business are necessary to protect the
goodwill purchased by the vendee. Therefore, these agreements are not
contrary to public policy." The courts apply the common law test of
reasonableness in determining the validity of these agreements, consid-
ering the circumstances of each case.5 6 However, Louisiana courts are
unwilling to apply a "reasonableness test" to agreements where an
employer seeks to protect his customers who are valuable assets in the
form of goodwill of the business. Goodwill, the earning potential of a
business gained through positive customer relations, quality products,
superior management, or a combination of factors, is an intangible asset.
If an employee is allowed to solicit his former employer's customers,
the value of the employer's goodwill will be diminished as the earning
potential of the business is decreased with the loss of each customer.
Arguably an owner's goodwill accumulated through years of business
should be protected whether ancillary to a contract of sale or a contract
of hiring. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin made no distinction of the
interests to be protected in Eureka Laundry Co. v. Long." It noted the
to and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use, and (b) is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy."
52. See Wright Chemical Corp. v. Johnson, 563 F. Supp. 501, 505 (M.D. La. 1983);
Standard Brands, 264 F. Supp. at 268-69.
53. La. R.S. 51:1401-18 (1978), and La. R.S. 51:1431-39 (1987).
54. See National Oil Service Inc. v. Brown, 381 So. 2d 1269 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1980).
55. See Moorman & Givens v. Parkerson, 131 La. 204, 59 So. 122 (1912).
56. Id. See also Comment, supra note 5, at 106-07.
57. 146 Wis. 205, 208-09, 131 N.W. 412, 413 (1911), noted in Carpenter, Validity
of Contracts Not to Compete, 76 U. Pa. L. Rev. 244, 267-68 (1928).
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necessity for the purchaser of a business to obtain a limited non-
competition agreement from the seller in order to protect the goodwill
established in the business. Protection is necessary to prevent the seller
from using his influence and familiarity with customers to divert trade
from the business until the buyer gains enough familiarity with the
customers to protect his own interests. 8 The court analogized this sit-
uation to the protection of goodwill incident to an employment contract
by stating:
So the owner of an established business says to a prospective
employee: 'In the employment you will become familiar with
the customers of my business in a way that I cannot. You will
meet them frequently, while I see them rarely, if ever. Now, I
will hire you upon the express condition that you will agree for
a limited length of time not to solicit trade from such of my
customers as you may have supplied while in my employ....
At the end of that time my new employees will be sufficiently
well acquainted with my customers to protect my business.' 9
The distinction between covenants not to compete as either incidental
to the sale of a business or incidental to a contract of employment
should not be dispositive of the validity afforded such agreements. 60
"The ultimate question should be the same in both cases-what is
necessary for the protection of the promisee's rights and is not injurious
to the public."'" Although there are also arguments against treating non-
competition agreements incident to the sale of a business similarly to
non-competition agreements in employment contracts, 62 the similar con-
cern in the protection of goodwill as an acquired proprietary interest
make it less objectionable to sustain a limited non-competition agreement
related to an employment contract such as a nonsolicitation of customers
clause.
Conclusion
Nonsolicitation of customers agreements do not have the effect of
restricting competition and depriving the employee of the right to earn
a living in all circumstances. The proper inquiry should be to determine
the true effect of the agreement rather than simply construing all non-
58. 131 N.W. at 413.
59. Id.
60. 14 S. Williston, supra note 39, § 1643, at 148.
61. Id. at 150-51.
62. Sellers of businesses usually have a better bargaining position than an employee
who may divest himself of his right to earn a livelihood with little thought of the
consequences. See Carpenter, supra note 58, at 268.
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solicitation agreements under La. R.S. 23:921 as restrictions on com-
petition. If the Louisiana Supreme Court should rule that nonsolicitation
of customers clauses are not within the broad prohibition of La. R.S.
23:921, there are several ways in which the court can insure that the
long-established public policy against non-competition agreements will
not be defeated.
The court could subject the employer to a heavier burden of proof
in establishing his right to protection. This can be done by forcing the
employer to prove the right to protection of his customers from a former
employee in light of all the factors suggested by the customer contact
theory. 63 In addition a nonsolicitation clause is much less restrictive than
a general non-competition agreement. Therefore an employee is not
deprived of a chance to earn a living with the particular skills he has
acquired if the agreement is limited only to the extent necessary to
protect the employer's interests in his customers. For example, an agree-
ment by an employee to refrain from soliciting any customer of his
former employer, regardless of whether the employee has had contact
with the customer, is no doubt an overbroad restraint on competition.
If the courts interpret nonsolicitation of customers clauses with consid-
eration of all the particular circumstances involved, rather than subjecting
these covenants to the "substantial expenditures" test under La. R.S.
23:921, a more equitable decision will be reached with due regard for
the conflicting interests of the employer, employee, and public.
Craig A. Courville
63. See Blake, supra note 9, at 658-67; Annotation, supra note 37, § 15.
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